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Abstract 
In this paper we focus on the dynamic interplay between increase in autonomy of 
regulatory agencies and political control of those agencies. The general research issues 
are the weak empirical foundations of regulatory reforms, the complex trade-off 
between political control and agency autonomy, the dual process of de-regulation and 
re-regulation, the problems of role-specialization and co-ordination, and the questions 
of «smart practice» in regulatory policy and practice. The theoretical basis is agency 
theories and a broad institutional approach that blend national political strategies, 
historical–cultural context and external pressures to understand regulatory agencies and 
regulatory reform. This approach is contrasted with a practitioner model of agencies. 
Empirically the paper is based on regulatory reform in Norway, giving a brief 
introduction to the reform and agency context followed by an analysis of the radical 
regulatory reform policy introduced recently by the current Norwegian government. We 
illustrate how regulatory reforms and agencies work in practice by focusing on two 
specific cases.  
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Sammendrag 
I dette notatet fokuserer vi på det dynamiske samspillet mellom økt autonomi for tilsyn 
og politisk styring av slike forvaltningsorgan. De generelle problemstillingene som tas 
opp er det svake empiriske fundamente for reguleringsreformer, den komplekse 
balansen mellom politisk styring og autonomi for tilsynsorganene, den samtidige 
prosessen av de-regulering og re-regulering, problemet med rollespesialisering og 
samordning, og spørsmålet om hva seo er en smart praksis når det gjelder 
reguleringspolicy og praksis. Det teoretiske grunnlaget er «agency teorier» og et bredt 
institusjonelt perspektiv som kombinerer nasjonale politisek strategier, historisk–
kulturelle kontekster og eksternt press for å forstå reguleringsorganer og regulerings-
reformer. Denne tilnærmingen blir holdt opp mot en prraktikermodell for regulerings-
myndigheter. Empirisk er notatet basert på reguleringsreformer i Norge. Det gis en 
introduksjon til konteksten knyttet til reformer og direktorater i Norge. Deretter 
presenteres og analyseres regjeringens nye tilsynspolitikk. Hovedan reguleringsreformen 
og tilsyn fungerer i praksis blir illustret ved hjelp av to case knyttet til Post- og 
teletilsynet og reorganiserng av den sentrale forvaltningen for samfunsikkerhet. 
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Introduction1 
Regulation and control have a long history in contemporary welfare states. Over time a 
number of regulatory bodies, broad-ranging in their legal basis, organizational structure 
and executive practice, have emerged. A broad and comprehensive program of 
regulatory reform launched internationally in recent years (OECD 1997, 2002a) has 
affected many countries, like Norway, that do not have a long tradition of pursuing a 
conscious policy towards regulation and scrutiny bodies. This reform program which 
intends to foster competition by use of central oversight units independent from 
regulators has entailed a fundamental review of supervisory agencies. In 2003 the 
Norwegian government formulated a new regulatory policy aimed at making supervisory 
bodies stronger and more autonomous and relocating some of them away from the 
capital. It also sought to clarify the regulatory role and improve horizontal co-ordination 
(St.meld. no 17 (2002–2003)). One of the chief features of this new policy is the 
regulation of market actors – whether public service-providers or private actors – but it 
also has implications for a broad range of regulatory agencies. Such a comprehensive 
conceptually driven holistic approach will probably be much harder to achieve than a 
more narrow, pragmatic and project-driven cooperation (Bardach 2004). Whether this 
new regulatory policy implies innovation and «smart practice» will be discussed (cf. 
Bardach 1998).  
We focus on the dynamic interplay between an increase in autonomy for regulatory 
agencies and political–administrative control of those agencies. In prescribing both 
enhanced autonomy and more control and re-regulation, the regulatory reform 
perpetuates an enduring tension in the history of regulatory governance. On the one 
hand, the agencies are to gain more autonomy, both from the political leadership and 
from market actors. On the other hand, central political control is to be enhanced by 
strengthening frame-steering and regulatory power. Political authorities are to abstain 
from involvement in individual cases but at the same time to strengthen their role as 
general regulators through the formulation of laws and rules or by the use of other 
general control instruments. 
In a departure from a view of government as a proactive and planning actor in 
substantive policy areas, the main premises of the new regulatory regime are a policy of 
competition and openness to the market. The autonomous agencies are, however, not 
free in any absolute sense, and it is important to ask what the prioritized of the new 
regime are. One answer is that it is designed to give leeway and powers of discretion to 
unbiased professionals with expertise in their field. In practice, however, professional 
experts might often be politically motivated. We therefore argue that it is important to 
treat the formulation, adoption and implementation of the new regulatory reforms and 
policies as political, rather than technical, phenomena. 
                                                 
1 We wish to thank Colin Campbell and  Paul G. Roness for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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Owing to the intensification of the regulatory reform process over the past few years, 
there is a need for more detailed empirical scrutiny of how reforms are formulated, how 
they are implemented and what effects and implications they have. While certain effects 
are expected and often promised, they are seldom reliably documented (Christensen, 
Lægreid and Wise 2003, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The expectation engendered by the 
official model (Pollitt et al. 2004) or the «public interest perspective» (James 2003) is that 
structural devolution and more managerial autonomy combined with performance 
management will improve performance and efficiency without having negative side-
effects on other values like control and democracy. Our argument is that this is a 
hypothesis, implying a smarter practice, and not an evidence-based fact and therefore 
needs to be examined through empirical studies.  
In contrast to the USA, which has a long and strong tradition of studying regulatory 
failures and the problem of regulated firms capturing or gaining control over those who 
regulate them, the study of the regulatory state is an area of research that only has 
enjoyed a high profile in Europe over the last decade (Majone 1996, Moran 2002). The 
European integration process, the work of international organizations like the OECD 
and ongoing reform efforts in the public sector have put new demands on the 
regulatory bodies. 
In the first part of this paper we focus on the weak empirical foundations of 
regulatory reforms, the complex trade-off between political control and agency 
autonomy, the dual process of de-regulation and re-regulation, and the problems of 
role-separation (specialization) and co-ordination as the main research issues. We try to 
discuss preconditions of smart practice related to the new regulatory policy, and outline 
different interpretations of this. The second part of the paper outlines the theoretical 
basis for regulatory reform. We take a look at agency theories and introduce a broad 
institutional approach that rejects single-factor explanations in favour of a blend of 
historical–cultural context, national political strategies and external pressures as the key 
to understanding regulatory agencies and regulatory reform. This approach will be 
contrasted with a practitioner model of agencies. In the third part of the paper we focus 
on regulatory reform in Norway, giving a brief introduction to the Norwegian reform 
and agency context followed by an analysis of the radical regulatory reform policy 
introduced recently by the current Norwegian government. We then illustrate how 
regulatory reforms and agencies work in practice by focusing on two specific cases, 
included a discussion of how smart the new practice might be. We conclude by 
discussing regulatory reform policy in the light of the theoretical approaches outlined. 
The research issues  
A central issue in studying reform of regulatory agencies is the tension involved in the 
dual process of introducing both more autonomy and more political control. On the 
one hand there is to be more managerial autonomy and discretion and more 
decentralization, flexibility, deregulation and devolution; on the other hand, central 
administrative and political control is to be increased through contractual arrangements, 
performance management, centralization, co-ordination and re-regulation. 
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Reorganization of public activity in Norway over the last ten years has been 
characterized by a gradual move away from an integrated to a more fragmented state. 
Supervisory and regulatory functions are now concentrated in specific administrative 
bodies, whereas commercial and service tasks have been transferred to specific state-
owned companies (Christensen and Lægreid 2003a). At the same time, the regulatory 
agencies have been under considerable pressure to reorganize. The current Norwegian 
government aims to increase the autonomy of the regulatory agencies by enhancing 
their professional independence and by establishing independent appeal boards so as to 
put them at arm’s length from the ministry as well as from regulated interests. 
This change from a unified central administration with mixed roles under ministerial 
rule to a separation of the different functions and tasks and their allocation to more 
autonomous bodies has yet to be studied systematically. Several of the reforms have 
weak empirical foundations and there is generally little systematic documentation of the 
effects of such reforms, but some more general studies seem to indicate that public 
choice-related arguments for increasing political control through devolution and single-
purpose organizations are difficult to fulfil in practice (Boston et al. 1996, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004). The degree to which the goal of independence is fulfilled for the 
supervisory agencies remains an empirical question. Creating separate, specialized 
agencies can contribute to a clearer demarcation of responsibilities and roles and greater 
efficiency and predictablility, but it may also result in increased complexity, problems of 
co-ordination, higher transaction costs and reduced potential for effective political 
control and accountability (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). This shows quite clearly that 
it could be disputed what may actually be smart practice concerning regulatory reform.  
One main research question related to this regulatory reform concerns the complex 
trade-off between political control and agency autonomy. How far can one go under the new 
regulatory regime in increasing an agency’s independence without losing political 
control? Through the process of modernization, attempts have been made to satisfy 
both demands simultaneously by finding an optimal blend of autonomy and control. 
The question is how a balance can be achieved in practice and how stable such a balance 
will be. The political executive, supported by the OECD, would like to decentralize 
decisions in individual cases; while at the same time striving for stronger central co-
ordination of regulatory policy (St.meld. no. 17 (2002–2003), OECD 2003). In this 
paper we challenge the assumption that such rational choice inspired reforms will 
enhance political control. Is it possible to accommodate political accountability and 
control even as professionalization, autonomization, deregulation and market 
orientation gain momentum (Christensen and Lægreid 2003b)? 
Although deregulation constitutes an important component of regulatory reforms, a 
process of «re-regulation» is also going on, involving new forms of control and 
supervision (Majone 1996, Vogel 1996). Thus we also face a complex process of simultaneous 
deregulation and re-regulation. An important question is whether these new forms of control 
are emerging as a supplement to established methods, thereby resulting in increased 
complexity, or whether they are replacing them; a third possibility is that old and new 
are merging to form new innovative methods of control and supervision. Furthermore, 
the task of supervision has undergone a considerable change from the traditional 
inspector role, focusing on compliance and individual cases, to more complex 
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performance-based control arrangements and frame regulations (Bleiklie et al. 2003). In 
contrast to the focus of New Public Management on de-regulation and autonomy, there 
has been an increase in the intensity, complexity and specialization of regulation in 
recent decades (Hood et al. 1999). However, the oversight «explosion» varies between 
countries and policy areas and often assumes new hybrid forms (Hood et al. 2004). 
The streamlining of the roles of regulator and controller implies an attempt to isolate 
and separate these roles from the other roles of the state – i.e., a reflection of increased 
horizontal specialization following the principle of «single-purpose organizations» 
(Boston et al. 1996). Thus we also face the problem of role-specialisation and the challenges of co-
ordination. In contrast to the traditional model of resolving conflicts between roles in a 
multifunctional state through role integration, the government has now adopted a «role 
streamlining» approach to the problem. This raises questions of feasibility. How does 
the dual separation of supervisory and regulatory authorities both from the provider and 
producer roles fulfilled by state-owned companies, and from the ownership role played 
by the state, work in practice (Christensen and Lægreid 2003a)?  
And important research question, summing up main features of the new regulatory 
reform in Norway, inspired by NPM and the OECD policy, is what the preconditions 
are for a smart practice and how such a policy might result in smart practice? The 
official OECD regulatory model seems to indicate that increased vertical differentiation 
or structural devolution potentially, implying a hands-off attitude from the political 
executives, is smart. The same argument is related to increased horizontal 
differentiation, through non-overlapping roles and functions. But it is interesting that 
the literature about smart practice, even though sympathetic towards these principles, 
talks quite a lot about some different features. Bardach (1998 and 2004) is preoccupied 
with «inter-agency collaborative capacity» and «craftmanship thinking» as a combination 
of creativity and public spritedness. He sees these features as major preconditions for 
smart practice. Barzelay (2004) stresses the vertical integrative efforts, joined-up 
government, and hands-on attitudes of political and administrative leaders as supporting 
successful innovation. As will be shown through the two case studies, the new 
Norwegian regulatory practice is actually combining old and new regulatory policy and 
we will analyze whether this hybrid in fact produces smarter practice than sticking to 
one or the other in pure form.  
The theoretical basis  
This section starts by describing the different academic agency theories. It goes on to 
outline our own approach and finally presents the official practitioner model of 
regulatory agencies. Regulation can be understood as a specific type of public activity 
with its normative foundations in law and legislative procedures. Control over what or 
who is subject to regulation is exercised by various administrative bodies and civil 
servants. This implies that studies of regulation may be regarded as part of general 
administrative research. Like the public administration in general, regulatory agencies are 
part of the democratic polity. They have defined goals, are linked to various 
administrative fields, have their own historical constraints and have developed various 
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practices in dealing with clients and superior political executives. Generally, regulatory 
agencies have a dual purpose: securing certain socially desirable values and assets, while 
protecting law-abiding subordinate actors from dishonest conduct and competition by 
others. 
Agency theories. By agencies we mean organizations whose status is defined in 
public law and whose functions are disaggregated from the ministry. Agencies have 
some autonomy from the ministry but are not fully independent,  since the ministry has 
the power to alter the budgets and main goals of the agency (Pollitt and Talbot 2004, 
Pollitt et al. 2004). Normally commercial corporations are not included in the agency 
concept. Regulatory agencies are a special type of agency, but it is easier to describe their 
similarities to other agencies than their differences, since regulatory functions are often 
integrated into or related to other functions, even in those regulatory bodies said to have 
a mainly regulatory role. We use the more general agency theories to analyze regulatory 
agencies.  
There is a growing literature on agencification. Talbot (2004) has identified three 
central features of agencies. First, structural disaggregation brought about by the 
creation of single-purpose organizations; second, performance management conducted 
by specifying contracts and performance targets, monitoring, reporting and assessment; 
and third, deregulation attained by delegating control over personnel, finance and other 
managerial tasks. This research field is, however, characterized by weak theoretical 
development, an absence of comparative data and analysis, and few empirically tested 
hypotheses (Bouckaert and Peters 2004).  
Three of the main questions addressed in the agency literature are (Pollitt et al. 2004): 
Why has the agency form become so popular over the past 15 years? How can agencies 
be steered and controlled by their parent ministries? Under what conditions do agencies 
perform well? To answer these questions one can use three different groups of theories 
(Pollitt 2004, Pollitt et al. 2004). The first group, which includes the rational choice and 
principal-agent models, can be broadly termed economic approaches (Dunleavy 1991, 
James 2003, Molander et al. 2002). These theories argue that agencies are chosen 
because they are more efficient than other organizational forms in central government. 
Their prescription for controlling agencies and smart practice is to design well-
functioning contracts. According to these theories, performance depends on how easy it 
is to monitor agencies and to what degree the agencies’ interests differ from those of the 
ministries.  
The second group of theories, which entail a more conventional and broader 
organizational research approach, seek to identify factors to explain the creation, 
maintenance, activities and performance of agencies. These factors range from structural 
instrumental features and deliberative political choice by political and administrative 
executives, to historical–institutional context, polity features, socio-economic forces and 
external pressure from the technical environment (Christensen and Lægreid 2003b, 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Build in here is also a negotiation perspective, suggested by 
Cyert and March (1963) and March and Olsen (1983), stressing that public decision-
making processes might result from negotiations and compromises between actors with 
different interests. A main lesson from this approach is that no single factor can explain 
the existence, steering and performance of agencies. The complexity of the context 
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matters, task-specific factors are important and much of what happens is the result of a 
blend of external pressure, path dependencies and choice (Olsen 1992).  
The third group of theories – which might be labelled the interpretative or socially 
constructive approach – is represented by the neo-institutionalist school, which focuses 
on how organizational forms may spread via the mechanisms of imitation, fashion and 
translation (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Meyer and Rowan 1977). Rhetoric and symbols 
are central features here. This approach, however, has more to say more about the 
emergence, existence and popularity of agencies than about their performance or how 
they are steered.  
Our approach follows Pollitt et al. (2004) and is a combination of conventional 
organizational research and neo-institutionalism, in a broad institutional perspective 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001). According to this approach, changes and reforms are 
both encouraged and discouraged by institutions (March and Olsen 1989, Brunsson and 
Olsen 1993). There is an interplay between institutional and historical links, conscious 
and planned reform initiatives, and adjustment to external  forces. Three dimensions are 
essential in this approach. First, the logic of appropriateness is a dominant logic of 
action. Second, goal formulation is often an endogenous process. Third, history is not 
efficient, and path-dependency and traditions may prevent or modify reform efforts 
(March and Olsen 1989). We ask whether there is a specifically Norwegian style of 
regulation, to what degree there has been an incremental adaptation to the market and 
competition perspective espoused by many international organizations, or whether there 
is cultural collusion. The new international regulatory orthodoxy, enhanced by the 
emerging universalistic reform model, will be examined and interpreted in terms of 
context. Both the historical–institutional context of national style of governance and 
individual institutional regulatory styles, based on specific identities, histories and 
dynamics, will be studied (Olsen 1997). The challenge is to describe and provide a better 
understanding of the dynamic balance between the institutional spheres of the market, 
professional expertise, autonomous agencies and representative democratic bodies in 
the field of regulatory reform. 
We operate with an extended effect concept, which not only focuses on internal 
administrative effects but also includes external political effects (Olsen 1996). 
Regulatory agencies must enjoy the confidence of both those they control and those on 
behalf of whom they exercise control – the political executive. This implies that 
regulation, control and supervision will be studied in a wider democratic context. A 
substantial democratic dilemma is how regulatory agencies are to gain enough autonomy 
to function efficiently, but not so much freedom as to make them politically 
uncontrollable. Does it create smart practice to chose one or the other, or a 
combination of the features? 
In contrast to this broad institutional approach to regulatory agencies, the «official 
model» is much more one-sided and we now turn to this model by focusing on the 
OECD approach to regulatory reforms. 
The practitioner model. In 1997 the OECD launched its Regulatory Reform 
Program (OECD 1997). Five years later Norway was assessed as country number 17 in 
row in order to reform regulations to foster competition, innovation, economic growth 
and important social objectives (OECD 2003). The OECD acknowledged that the 
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Nordic incremental, consensus-oriented model of governance, emphasizing egalitarian 
values, a high level of mutual trust, solidarity, high standards of social welfare, an active 
intervening state, broad participation from affected interests and a large public sector, 
had been successful. Norway is one of the world’s wealthiest countries, its economy is 
well managed, the system of governance influences priorities, and a core policy goal is to 
maintain a dispersed settlement pattern.  
In spite of this success and the fact that Norway still performs very well today, the 
OECD report suggested that Norway should abandon this governance model and 
«prepare for the future now». The problems are not present today but will come in the 
future. It was more or less taken for granted that the integrated, reactive, ad hoc and 
piecemeal approach, which balances different values and goals, should be replaced by 
comprehensive, proactive and systematic regulatory reforms. Without any deep analysis, 
it was suggested that the well-functioning Norwegian model should be replaced by the 
new OECD orthodoxy, indicating a smarter practice. The new recipe is to separate the 
regulatory role of the state from its roles as owner, policy-maker and commercial actor, 
to upgrade competition policy to make it the main goal, to deregulate and liberalize state 
monopolies, to reduce state ownership, commercialize public services, and  improve the 
performance, efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. Competitive neutrality is 
essential, the commitment to competition should be more wholehearted, and the 
government should retain less public control in the liberalization process. What was not 
discussed was that such a change might well be at odds with traditional state norms and 
values and cause increased conflicts in society, thus reducing efficiency and effectiveness 
and potentially reducing smart practice. 
The recommendation was to separate the regulatory function from the commercial 
one and to reduce the potential for ministerial intervention by making agencies more 
autonomous and professional. Consensus-based decision-making should be replaced by 
evidence-based decision-making. Political intervention in particular decisions should be 
replaced by the establishment of expert-based appeal bodies outside the political system. 
With the exception of the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, the ministries 
were criticized for lacking a business perspective; it was thus argued that responsibility 
for state owned companies should be transferred away from their sector ministries, and 
performance contracts and privatization should be introduced more broadly. 
The regulatory agencies in Norway seem to have developed without experiencing any 
major crisis; they cope well with technical tasks and have demonstrated good regulatory 
practice and a capacity for adaptation. In spite of this positive assessment, the OECD 
criticized the regulatory reforms for being partial and piecemeal, and the policy 
recommendation was to strengthen the independence and authority of the regulatory 
agencies by reducing the opportunities for appealing decisions to the minister and the 
ministry’s scope for instructing the agencies. Further recommendations were to clarify 
the institutional framework and functional responsibility by formulating clear and 
unambiguous goals for the independent supervisory agencies; to improve co-ordination 
among the regulators; and to strengthen the framework for accountability and improve 
monitoring of the agencies’ performance. 
The official raison d’être for autonomous agencies is that structural separation, more 
managerial autonomy and managerial accountability for results will improve per-
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formance (James 2003, OECD 2002a, Pollitt et al. 2004). In practice, however, this has 
not been proved as a general finding. The regulatory reform model advocated by the 
OECD seems to be driven more by ideology than by evidence-based facts (Olsen 2004). 
It would be fair to say that the official model is more a special case that seems to work 
pretty well under specific conditions—namely, in situations with low political salience, 
where results and activities are easy to observe, when the tasks do not involve complex 
technology, when the risk is relatively low, when the financial resources involved are 
fairly modest, and when the policy does not involve redistribution issues. When these 
preconditions are not fulfilled, however, it tends to run into trouble (Pollitt 2003a). 
Other important factors are the degree of competition and the extent to which 
international markets, rules and regulations are involved. The lesson is that context 
matters and that there is no best way of governing agencies. In this perspective smart 
practice will be context-dependent. Neither the organizational structure, nor the daily 
practical work, nor the steering of agencies is standardised. 
The case of Norway 
The Norwegian context  of  administrat ive  
reforms and agencies   
The question of whether to organize agencies connected to the Norwegian ministries, 
and particularly their organizational affiliation, status and role have been important 
issues for nearly 180 years (Christensen 2003). Norway’s first constitution of 1814 
introduced hierarchically organized ministries and marked the beginning of a period 
known as «the civil servants’ state». By the 1830s professional groups, such as engineers, 
doctors and military leaders, were mounting their first attacks on the dominance of the 
jurists in the integrated and hierarchical state (Christensen and Roness 1999). Around 
1850 they succeeded in pushing through their demands for independent professional 
bodies outside the ministries and the first agencies were established, primarily in the 
communications sector. This first wave of agencies was followed by a second one in the 
1880s. This established the independent agency type, imitated from Sweden, which has 
been the dominant one in Norway ever since. 
In the mid-1950s the government stated a new principle for agency structure and 
increased the number of independent agencies. The background to this was that the 
ministers needed to delegate some of their functions and tasks in order to gain more 
capacity for strategic thinking (Grønlie and Nagel 1998). The doctrine recommended 
the same organizational solution that the professional groups had supported since the 
1830s, but the argument was now that it enhanced political control, whereas previously 
it had been quite the opposite. The idea was that more technical issues and routine 
functions should be moved to the agencies, while policy and planning tasks should stay 
with the ministries. The new doctrine resulted in the establishment of several new 
agencies over the next 15 years, but this development slowed down in the 1970s, partly 
for political reasons (Grønlie 1999).  
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The dominant agency model in Norway has historically been rather unified, with little 
horizontal specialization. In most agencies administrative functions, regulatory and 
control functions and service-production functions have been combined and integrated. 
Traditionally Norway has not had any type of administrative court. Appeals are directed 
to the ministry, which can also instruct the agencies. It is a rather new idea that there 
ought to be different types of agencies, even if some of the agencies have had extended 
autonomy for some time, mainly in budgetary and personnel matters but also in some 
more substantive areas  (Lægreid et al. 2003, Statskonsult 2004). 
Over the past 15 years, partly inspired by NPM, but also as part of Norway’s 
adaptation to the EU and the internal market, a process of structural devolution has 
been going on in the Norwegian central public administration in Norway, and the 
agency model has become more differentiated (Christensen and Lægreid 2003b). This 
combines vertical inter-organizational specialization, whereby agencies formally are getting 
more authority, with increased horizontal inter-organizational spesialization, whereby roles 
and functions among agencies are more differentiated and non-overlapping.  
Up until the mid-1990s major public sectors like railways, telecommunications, 
power, postal services, forestry, grain sales, airport administration, road construction 
and public broadcasting, were organized as integrated government services, whereby the 
state held the roles of owner, provider, purchaser, regulator and controller. Since then, 
the commercial parts of these enterprises have become corporate, while the regulatory 
parts have been streamlined into separate agencies, creating a much more fragmented 
and disintegrated model.  
In 1999 there were 193 central administrative bodies in Norway; two years later this 
number had decreased to 169. Certain bodies were merged and reorganized, with some 
of them becoming state-owned companies. Sixty of these bodies are now typical 
agencies: 25 are mainly regulatory agencies, while 11 have regulatory functions together 
with other tasks. Over time an increasing proportion of agencies have been allocated 
regulation and scrutiny as their primary task in addition to other, secondary tasks 
(Rubecksen 2003). 
The developmental significance of this reorganization is related to several factors. 
First, this shows the development from an integrated state model, where many 
functions are handled in the ministries or in agencies under tight control by the 
ministries, to a management-inspired model where agencies are more autonomous and 
loosely coupled to the ministries. Second, the ministries ability to control the agencies is 
thereby weakened, political signals are less significant to the agencies, and it’s more 
difficult for the political executives to get information from the agencies (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2001). This is potentially problematic in a system where structural 
devolution is combined with no change in principle of ministerial responsibility towards 
the parliament. Third, the potential for increasing problems of capacity and 
coordination was evident. 
Summing up, agencies have been a major organizational form in the Norwegian 
central government for a long time and have displayed a lot of path-dependency. This 
situation was the result of a long historical conflict between the political executive and 
professional groups. After the NPM-movement gained pace internationally from the 
early 1980s, Norway became a reluctant reformer (Olsen 1996). Since the mid-1990s 
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NPM has gained a stronger footing in Norway, and reforms have become increasingly 
comprehensive and radical in recent years (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The 
introduction of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR), private sector 
management tools, changes in forms of affiliation from integrated ministerial models to 
single-purpose models, increased agencification and the establishment of autonomous 
supervisory bodies have been the result. We will now explore more fully the arguments 
for adapting some of the main elements from the OECD practitioner model and see 
how they are working in the Norwegian context, i.e. whether the preconditions for 
smart practice is clearly defined and whether this new policy produce smart practice in 
reality. 
Recent  regulatory  pol icy  in  Norway:  A  
fundamenta l  review of  regulatory  
agencies  
Under the current government in Norway, which came to power in 2001 and is headed 
by a Centre-Conservative minority cabinet, the whole basis of the agency structure, 
particularly the regulatory agencies, has been discussed several times. Several changes 
have been implemented, but it remains to be seen whether this will add up to a 
fundamental revision of the system. The central actors in this process have been 
Statskonsult, the agency for governmental administrative development, and the Ministry 
of Labour and Government Administration. In the following some central documents 
in the new trend towards more agencyfication or autonomization will be discussed. As 
will be seen, some main arguments from the OECD practitioner model are used, 
demonstrating the element of imitation in this process. 
The preparatory reports. In 2002 Statskonsult issued three reports about the 
structure of the central political–administrative system in Norway (Statskonsult 2002a, 
2002b, 2002c). These reports formed part of a new set of arguments about the 
disintegration of the centralized state, i.e., they showed ongoing trends but also provided 
normative guidelines for future policy.  
The first report argued that the ministries ought to expand their role as a «secretariat 
for the political leadership», implying more vertical specialization (Statskonsult 2002a). 
The idea was to give the ministries a more one-dimensional role – as policy-makers and 
developers. As such they would have to «purchase» advice and analyses from the 
agencies or other sources and also leave implementation to the agencies. The time had 
come, the report argued, to delegate more tasks to the agencies, which should have the 
freedom and autonomy to use their professional knowledge without instruction from of 
the cabinet and individual ministers. The report did not say much about why 
professional autonomy should be of particular importance in the regulatory agencies or 
what the implications of such changes might be. This failure to engage in strong means-
end thinking showing a feature that is also typical of the process further down the line. 
The second report recommended a more thorough discussion of how to make the 
regulatory agencies less subject to instructions from the minister (Statskonsult 2002b). It 
saw as particularly crucial the attainment of less ambiguous principles concerning the 
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degree of freedom different functions should have. A further subject of discussion 
advocated was whether a new type of independent professional regulatory agency for 
controlling the implementation of regulations should be established. It was argued that 
MBOR and the «steering dialogue» between the ministries and agencies were excessively 
determined by situational factors and should be more strategic and long-term. It was 
also recommended that the status of the purchaser-provider model as an instrument 
governing relations between ministries and agencies should be clarified. 
The third report on regulatory agencies and supervisory functions advocated giving 
regulatory agencies a single role (Statskonsult 2002c). It argued that the regulatory 
function should not be combined with other tasks, the regulatory agency should not 
have contradictory goals, and it should be given more autonomy from the respective 
ministry. This development is said to be a widespread institutional standard in the 
OECD and EU area and is connected to the liberalization of public sectors formerly 
dominated by monopolies.  
The report stated that regulatory agencies should be organized according to how 
much autonomy the agencies have from the ministries and whether the agencies have 
one or more functions or tasks. At one extreme are the agencies that are multi-
functional and close to the ministry, a reflection of the traditional Norwegian model; at 
the other extreme are agencies with much autonomy and only regulatory or supervisory 
functions, a model that the current Centre-Conservative government obviously favours. 
The report advocated a greater separation of political and administrative functions, 
arguing that political intervention in individual cases might decrease public trust in 
government. Another argument was that there may be tension between the goals of the 
agencies and the ministries, implying that keeping many contradictory goals and 
functions in a ministry could influence in a negative way the ministry’s control of the 
agencies. A third argument was that more autonomy would bring about a less 
ambiguous, more efficient and more appropriate division of labour between ministries 
and regulatory agencies.  
It was argued that merging some agencies could produce synergy effects since some 
of the agencies are too small. The report advocated regulatory agencies with cross-
sectoral domains of responsibility, a view that was somewhat at odds with the opinion 
of the political leadership (Hommen 2003a). It was proposed that regulatory agencies 
should be separated organizationally from the ownership function, sectoral policy, 
service production and specific guidance, meaning that regulatory agencies should be 
moved to other ministries. Supervisory competence was to be attained by having more 
cross-sectoral regulatory agencies.  
The White Paper. In January 2003 the current Centre-Right minority government 
put forward a White Paper to the parliament (St.meld nr. 17 – (2002–2003)), proposing 
changes in regulatory agencies. The White Paper was partly based on the reports from 
Statskonsult but mainly on the political priorities of the cabinet, particularly those of the 
minister for government administration. Both the OECD’s regulatory program and the 
European Economic Area Agreement, which gives Norway access to the EU internal 
market, affected the content of this report. So the imitation of an international standard 
for organizing regulatory agencies was rather evident. 
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The White Paper aimed to change the reform process from ad hoc and piecemeal 
changes in individual agencies to an overarching and comprehensive regulatory policy. It 
also upgraded competition policy to a main issue for regulatory policy. The paper stated 
that more use of markets and decentralized models of steering and control, seen as a 
good thing in themselves, should be supplemented with and counterbalanced by 
stronger regulatory activities on behalf of collective interests. The report aimed to 
explore both the vertical issue of whether regulatory agencies had an appropriate degree 
of constraints and autonomy and, more specifically, the question of the division of 
functions and tasks among the ministries, agencies and regulatory agencies. As far as 
horizontal specialization is concerned, the report focused on the division of functions 
and tasks among the regulatory agencies. 
The government formulated four ideals or goals concerning the organization and 
functioning of regulatory activities. The first was that, since combining administrative, 
service-producing and regulatory activities was seen as undesirable, regulatory agencies 
should have unambiguous roles, thus breaking with the Norwegian tradition of 
integrating different roles and functions. This is an argument for more horizontal 
specialization in the form of non-overlapping roles, as in the principle of «single-
purpose organizations» in New Zealand (Boston et al. 1996). A main objective was to 
provide more clarity in the horizontal design of regulatory agencies. The second ideal, 
which followed from the first one, was that each regulatory agency should have 
unambiguous and non-contradictory collective goals, and that different agencies should 
not work towards the same goals.  
Third, regulatory agencies should increase their independence from the ministries. 
Political and professional considerations and premises should be more clearly defined, 
and the way they are to be balanced made more explicit. Political considerations should 
be confined primarily to setting general norms via laws and rules; but executive 
politicians should leave individual cases to be handled by competent professionals in the 
regulatory agencies, albeit while maintaining political control. The regulatory agencies 
were to be endowed with legitimacy by removing the ambiguity inherent in mixing 
political and professional considerations and by making the balance between them more 
explicit. It was also stressed that the independence of regulatory agencies could be 
ensured by moving them to another ministry, i.e., de-coupling regulatory activities from 
sectoral considerations and pressure. The fourth goal was to strengthen the professional 
competence of the regulatory agencies. 
The specific proposals based on these goals affected the regulatory agencies in 
several ways. First of all, it was proposed to establish some new agencies, some of them 
sectoral, others cross-sectoral, some based on a purpose principle, others on functions. 
Thus, the government did not confine itself to a single form of horizontal organisation. 
Moreover, some of the new agencies were the result of mergers—suggesting less rather 
than more horizontal specialization. Second, changes in the law were proposed to limit 
the opportunities for ministers to instruct the agencies in the handling of individual 
cases. The idea was to direct ministerial responsibility more towards broader policy 
questions and major decisions involving important underlying principles. In addition, 
changes in this restriction would now require the approval of the cabinet as a whole, 
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rather than of just a single minister, making the threshold for political intervention 
higher.  
Third, it was proposed to change the complaints procedure in several agencies by 
establishing independent bodies of appeal. Only in cases indicated by specific important 
considerations would the law allow the cabinet to overturn a decision of the supervisory 
agencies, thus ensuring that the independence of the agencies was not undermined. 
Fourth, it was proposed to move seven regulatory agencies out of Oslo. It was argued 
that relocation would reduce political control and remove the agencies from the 
influence of other actors, such as other relevant agencies, other central administrative 
actors, interest groups and ad hoc groups. This proposal was inspired by the capture 
literature (Majone 1996) – re-location being an attempt to reduce the capture of 
regulatory agencies by regulated interests as well as by politicians. 
The government proposals generally point in the direction of a disintegrated state 
brought about by a combination of increased vertical specialization – more independent 
regulatory agencies and independent appeal boards – and increased horizontal 
specialization – the establishment of more specialized agencies and less overlap between 
them. What is striking about the White Paper and the proposals is that political steering 
and democratic control are hardly mentioned, indicating a heavy bias towards the NPM-
oriented «supermarket state» rather than the centralized, hierarchical state (Olsen 1988). 
The need to strengthen the framework for accountability is not addressed either. 
Establishing independent bodies over which political control would not be particularly 
strong may well raise legitimacy concerns connected with accountability, but such 
challenges are not discussed. The impression is that political control and influence from 
above, whether from the parliament or from executive politicians, is inappropriate and 
should therefore be undermined. In this respect the report is in tune with the anti-
political sentiments expressed in NPM (Self 2000). Although the report acknowledges 
that differentiating between political and professional decision-making premises might 
be difficult, it goes on to address this question as if it were easy. The proposal to limit 
control of agencies by executive politicians is treated as a bureaucratic-judicial issue. The 
new proposed structures, be they more independent agencies or appeal boards, are not 
analyzed in terms of the consequences for political control. No attention is paid either 
to the complexity implied by these proposals, such as the increased need for co-
ordination or the challenges and potential ambiguities resulting from moving regulatory 
agencies away from the sector ministries.  
Another important feature of the report is its strong emphasis on the need for 
professional autonomy in regulatory agencies. However, there is little discussion of why 
this consideration should carry more weight than political–democratic considerations. 
The experience of other countries, such as the US, which has shown that independent 
regulatory agencies do not just secure professional autonomy but can also result in 
capture of a different type as well as the politicization of professions (Mitnick 1980), is 
barely mentioned in the report. Without engaging in any very profound analysis, the 
report argues that the legitimacy of decisions made by regulatory agencies is based 
primarily on professional competence and autonomy, much more so than on the 
control of executive politicians.  
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The parliamentary debate. The White Paper was controversial in its making and 
there were conflicts between the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration 
and other ministries and the affected agencies before it was issued. The main focus of 
the conflict and public debate was the relocation issue, which diverted attention from 
the question of political control and agency autonomy. The first phase after the report 
became public was marked by intense lobbying, leaks from agencies and ministries, 
open hearings in parliament, debates in party conferences and strong media coverage. 
There was strong lobbying from the affected agencies, the unions and the cities where 
the agencies were supposed to be relocated as well as from  Oslo. Most of the political 
parties were split over the relocation issue. The government report resulted in a tug of 
war between some major parties in parliament and was eventually modified concerning 
the question of political control (Hommen 2003a).  
The passage of the proposal through parliament had certain striking features 
(Hommen 2003a). First, the part of the proposal that had been most controversial 
during the public debate, namely the relocation of several regulatory agencies, gave rise 
to little debate or tension. The minister obviously knew that cutting across geographical 
alliances would secure a majority for this proposal, and this indeed proved to be the 
case. The right-wing Progressive Party was against most of the proposals, but had 
difficulty finding allies. The Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party could have joined 
this resistance, but they were ridden by internal disagreement and were also facing local 
elections, so they went along with the majority. While the minister argued for relocation 
to reduce the problem of regulatory capture, the parliamentarians regarded it primarily 
as a regional policy issue.  
Second, when the proposal was addressed in the relevant standing committee in May 
2003, it was obvious that the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party had the key 
(supporting relocation) to the solution of the question of more independent regulatory 
agencies. The focus now moved from the relocation issue to the independence issue and 
confrontation was replaced by bargaining. After some bickering the governmental 
parties struck a deal with the two opposition parties, modifying their proposal on this 
point. The part of the proposal stipulating that independent appeal boards should 
handle complaints or appeals was withdrawn and postponed until the next election 
period. This was seen as important by the opponents, since keeping the handling of the 
appeals in the ministries is an important part of political control.  
The other part of the deal was more ambiguous. It was decided that the proposal to 
restrict the power of the executive political leaders to instruct the agencies should be 
handled case by case, not as a general principle. This was nonetheless seen by the 
minister as a breakthrough for the new principle of reduced ministerial instruction, since 
he gained support for some specific proposals. The opposition, on the other hand, tried 
to give the impression that this would lead to very little change in overall political 
control and was purely of symbolic importance, since ministers seldom use their right to 
instruct. The agreement states that the minister can intervene in important cases and 
that he/she can instruct the regulatory agencies to handle specific cases, implying 
business as usual. For the Labour Party it was important not to reduce the opportunities 
for political control, while for the minister it was significant that agency independence 
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had been underlined. The compromise was ambiguous and open to both inter-
pretations. 
Summing up, there was a trade-off between relocation of agencies and greater 
independence. The government received support for the relocation of seven agencies, 
but the price it had to pay was a modification of the autonomy-oriented reform. The 
conflicts over regulatory policy reflect a traditional cleavage in the Norwegian 
administrative policy debate about how to balance political control and agency 
autonomy that goes back 150 years. However, this is not the last word on administrative 
reform and there may well be a replay on the autonomy issue when the government 
proposes reforms of individual agencies or when there is a change of government.  
Regulatory  reform processes and 
regulatory  agencies  in  pract ice .  
It is important to distinguish between regulatory policies on the one hand and specific 
reform processes and the daily practice of regulatory agencies on the other hand. The 
regulatory policy the political executive recently have tried to further in Norway very 
much attend to the OECD official model in stressing that the preconditions for smart 
practice is structural devolution and horizontal specialization, but we have shown that 
the decided policy more is a hybrid where these features are important, but not totally 
dominant. We will now illustrate the variety of reform processes and agency practice by 
focusing on two cases. The first is connected with the reorganization of internal 
security, focusing on horizontal coordination. It exemplifies the loose coupling between 
regulatory policy programs and reform processes. The second is the Teletopia case, 
focusing on vertical coordination. It demonstrates how regulatory agencies work in 
practice and the practical problems of balancing autonomy and control on a day-to-day 
basis. The cases both illustrate the different interpretations of smart practice. 
The organization of internal security. Parallel to the formulation of the 
comprehensive governmental program of regulatory policy, a reorganization of the 
central apparatus for internal security was taking place. The government launched this 
process in 1999 by appointing a public commission to assess the vulnerability of 
Norwegian society. The commission’s report was submitted to the Ministry of Justice in 
2000 (NOU 2000:24). One of the commission’s main proposals was to improve vertical 
and horizontal co-ordination in the security administration by establishing a new special 
ministry of internal security. These recommendations were, however, not approved by 
the government in the White Paper presented to parliament in 2002 (St.meld. no 17 
(2001–2002)). Somewhat surprisingly, the process resulted in only minor changes in the 
security administration (Lægreid and Serigstad 2004, Serigstad 2003). An important 
finding is that this relatively comprehensive reorganization process yielded only minor 
changes in the status quo, despite the fact that the Vulnerability Commission had 
recommended radical organizational changes. Ultimately a hierarchical model of this 
kind proved to be too radical for the ministries involved, and the Bondevik II 
government opposed the idea of a special ministry of internal security in favour of an 
upgrading and strengthening of the agencies in the field, achieved partly through 
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mergers and partly by establishing more semi-autonomous agencies. However, no 
separate appeal boards or specific limitations on instructions from the ministries were 
introduced. The case illustrates how difficult it is to move responsibility for an agency 
from one ministry to another. The Ministry of Justice received approval for its 
traditional view of how to organize the field, and so did the Ministry of Defence. In 
contrast to the major dispute that took place over the organizational model, there was 
overall agreement about what the problems were in the field of internal security. Most 
of the bodies and actors involved acknowledged the problems of fragmentation, weak 
co-ordination and low priority assigned to internal security, but no agreement on a 
radical organizational solution was possible. This may show how difficult it is to further 
smart practice through inter-agency coordination (cf. Bardach 1998), something that 
Kettl’s (2004) analysis of 9/11 and organizing for homeland security shows. Historically 
in Norway, it was also evident that separate organizations for internal security, attending 
to different aspects of the policy, also have had advantages (cf. Landau 1969).  
All in all the process revealed a conflict over how to define internal security, showing 
Bardach’s (2004) main point that «conceptually-driven cooperation» is hard to achieve. 
Should internal security be regarded primarily as a defence matter or should be treated 
as an aspect of civil society and therefore be assigned to the Ministry of Justice? Should 
it be regarded as just one of many spheres covered by general regulatory policy or rather 
as a special field with its own particular problems and challenges? Clearly the definition 
of internal security also had implications for identifying the main problems, finding 
appropriate solutions and identifying legitimate actors and participants. Opinion here 
was divided between institutions rather than cutting across them. Disagreement between 
the justice and defence sectors over how to define safety, security and being prepared, 
and where to place responsibility for them, became most pronounced during the 
governmental process and in the parliamentary reading. 
The analysis of the process shows the relevance of a broad institutional perspective. 
As the process went on, the rational approach gradually gave way to a negotiation 
perspective. In contrast to what an instrumental model might have predicted, the goals 
became ambiguous and subject to change and there was a loose coupling between the 
general regulatory program and the specific reorganization process, and between 
different phases of the process. The solutions offered by different actors and the 
conflict between different parties can be construed primarily in terms of organisational 
affiliation and sector interests. Somewhat surprisingly the increasing pressure from the 
environment in the post 9/11 period had little effect on the reorganization process. 
In addition, local rationality and efforts to defend path-dependent institutional 
identity and ensure institutional survival as well as cultural collusion between the civilian 
and military administrations explain important aspects of the reorganization process. 
One important characteristic of the process was that the defence sector was opposed to 
co-ordination. While almost everyone agreed that co-ordination was of utmost 
importance and that improvements were necessary, none of the actors ultimately wanted 
to engage in co-ordination. The process can thus be said to be characterized by negative 
co-ordination (Mayntz and Sharpf 1975), where the wish to co-ordinate was greater than 
the willingness to engage in it.  
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Summing up, this process is an interesting documentation of the parallel processes of 
robustness and flexibility, which cannot easily be explained in terms of a single factor or 
as a simple adaptation of the comprehensive regulatory program. Our analysis reveals a 
process of bureaucratic politics but also a strong component of institutional constraints 
based on path-dependency, institutional identity and historical inefficiency. The case 
illustrates that strong sectoral ministries make it difficult for the cabinet and the Ministry 
of Government Administration to implement a comprehensive regulatory policy 
program. There is no quick and easy adaptation to new regulatory policy signals from 
the executives, and the process can thus best be understood from a broad institutional 
perspective – as a blend of actor-specific interests, institutional identities and traditions, 
as well as instrumental choices made by political–administrative leaders. Whether it 
would have implied a smarter practice to establish a broad ministry or merged agency of 
internal security is, however, an open question. It could be argued that keeping a 
modified organization for internal security gives flexibility and make it possible to attend 
to many considerations at the same time, giving the solution a high legitimacy. 
The Teletopia case.2 The Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority 
(NPTA) was established in 1987 as a result of the liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector. Its rationale was a perceived need to divide the regulatory 
and service-providing roles. The role of NPTA, which is primarily financed by 
governmental dues and fees, was to take responsibility for the control and scrutiny 
functions in the telecommunications and postal sectors. It was organized as a body 
subordinate to the Ministry of Transport and Communications but with some degree of 
independence: the power to take decisions on individual cases was delegated to NPTA 
and a clause in the law on telecommunications restricted the ministry’s power to issue 
instructions to the agency. The agency gradually developed a sceptical attitude towards 
Telenor, the former dominant public tele-communications monopoly, which was turned 
into a state-owned company and then partially privatized in 2001. The reason for this 
was that Telenor was seen as the main roadblock to increased and free competition in 
the telecommunications sector, and hence as undermining the interests of consumers.
 The background to the Teletopia case was that several small firms had for a long 
time been trying, largely unsuccessfully, to sell services by connecting to the Telenor 
network. In 2001 NPTA decided that Telenor should give Teletopia, a small private 
firm, access to its cell-phone network for providing SMS messages. Telenor appealed to 
the ministry to reverse the decision but it was upheld. The issue was now to decide on 
the conditions of access. As Telenor and Teletopia were unable to reach agreement, 
NPTA acted as a mediator. After a lot of bickering, information and arguments from 
the two parties, NPTA ruled on the case in  2003, deciding which price model should be 
used and that Telenor should not be compensated over and above the actual access 
costs. An exact access price to be paid by Teletopia to Telenor per SMS message was 
set, albeit one much lower than Telenor had demanded. 
                                                 
2 The data used here is collected by a graduate student, Beate Erikstad, Department of Political Science, University of 
Oslo, who is writing on a thesis about the regulatory activities of NPTA. 
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Telenor criticized the NPTA’s decision, on the grounds of wrong assessment of the 
cost question. It lodged a formal and comprehensive appeal with the Council for 
Telecommunications Administration. The council upheld the decision, but Telenor also 
appealed to the ministry, a legitimate move in cases concerning wider principles. The 
ministry eventually ruled that another pricing model, closer to what Telenor wanted, 
should be used. NPTA was very critical of this decision and thought it was wrong. 
An analysis of this case may take as a point of departure the complexity of both the 
political–administrative apparatus and the handling of the case. To start with, NPTA is 
an example of a cross-sectoral regulatory agency, created as a result of the idea that there 
should be more competition in service-providing markets. It is thus a hybrid 
organization, a feature that may complicate the handling of certain cases. Second, the 
telecommunications sector is said to combine deregulation and re-regulation; the latter 
implying the existence of clear laws and rules for handling cases. In reality, however, the 
Teletopia case shows that the system is open to interpretation, particularly in 
complicated cases. Hence the negotiation approach was adopted by both NPTA and the 
ministry. Third, path-dependency clearly has a major role to play in cases like this, since 
the monopoly actor (in this case Telenor) has invested a lot of resources in its network 
and services and has the advantage of having strong political connections; NPTA, on 
the other hand, is interested in defending the newer anti-monopoly and competition 
path. The earlier stated principle of cost-oriented prices that constrained the handling of 
the case was also the product of path-dependency. Fourth, environmental pressure is 
strong, both from the institutional environment, constituted mainly by the media, and 
from the technical environment, involving many new actors in telecommunications; 
moreover, the EU influences both the institutional and technical environments. 
Contrary to the belief that the new regulatory regime is a clear-cut and objective 
system, the essence of the Teletopia case reveals an ambiguous system of negotiation 
and a struggle to balance control and autonomy. While the leadership of NPTA took a 
rather sceptical attitude towards Telenor and strove to set a much lower access price  
than Telenor wanted, the experts in the agency exercised a modifying influence. This 
negotiation-based approach was then extended to the handling of the case in the appeal 
council, which sided with NPTA. Not surprisingly, the final decision in the ministry fell 
in favour of Telenor, something that can be explained in terms of path-dependency, 
traditional political support for Telenor and worries that new actors would become free-
riders on major investments made by traditionally strong public actors in the past,  thus 
discouraging further major investment by the latter. All these factors modify the judicial 
and economic arguments and discretion lower down the system, mainly in NPTA. 
This process is more about regulation in practice than the first case and the concerns 
the vertical specialization or more directly the vertical integration. The different actors 
played their roles defined in the new regulatory regime, often not that well defined as 
thought, and the ministry had to enact discretion in its decision. Again, whether it would 
have been a smarter practice only to follow the decision of the regulatory agency is 
disputable. The decision made had its legitimacy through balancing different 
considerations. 
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Insights from the cases. A main observation from these two cases is that one 
cannot easily infer from regulatory programs and formal structure to practice. While 
there might be some loose coupling between comprehensive policy programs and 
specific reorganizations in certain policy areas, agency status in itself is a highly uncertain 
predictor of steering relationships (Pollitt 2003b). The legal status and formal powers of 
the agencies represent broad categories that allow for huge variations in practice. There 
are significant variations in steering relationships both between different policy areas 
and agencies and within the same agency over time. In practice there are great variations 
in how the rules for control, instructions and appeals are formulated for different 
agencies and how they are practised.  
There are also major variations in how the MBOR system is practised, with both the 
focus and the intensity differing between ministries and agencies (Statskonsult 2004). 
Some agencies have long and detailed steering documents. Others are briefer and more 
general. Some are embedded in a close informal steering dialogue with extensive contact 
patterns with the parent ministry. Others stick to formal and more general rules and 
regulations. Normally the parent ministries do not try to steer how the agencies handle 
individual cases and there are generally very weak signals on professional issues from the 
parent ministry to the semi-independent regulatory agencies (Hommen 2003b, 
Statskonsult 2004). In crises, however, the ministry may intervene and withdraw the 
delegated autonomy (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). Agencies with extended autonomy 
do not differ from regular agencies in the way the parent ministry practises the MBOR 
system. A general deficit is the lack of monitoring and reporting of efficiency and results 
in the agencies (Statskonsult 2002b). There is also considerable variety in how the parent 
ministry uses such performance reports as do exist.  
The two cases illustrate both the horizontal and vertical aspects of regulatory policy 
and smart practice respectively. The first case shows that it’s difficult to implement the 
new regulatory policy through inter-agency cooperation and merger, but also important 
actors hesitate to accept that changing the structure would get a smarter regulatory 
practice. One reason for this is that organizing according to this new logic would have 
modified the agencies ability to attend to different aspects of internal security. So this 
illustrates one of Gulick (1937) main points that organizing public organizations 
according to certain principles concerning specialization and coordination may solve 
some problems, but also potentially create some new one. The formal organization 
structure is important for understanding variety in decision-making behaviour, but no 
one specific design can guarantee  smart practice (Hammond, Jen and Maeda 2003, 
Hammond 2004). 
The second case is attending more to the vertical dimension of regulatory policy. The 
system of regulation in the post and telecommunication area in Norway is now set up 
very much in accordance with the official and ideal model of OECD. The case show 
how the different actors are furthering their roles and interests according to this model, 
but this is not a model that result in an objective and smart practice. When the different 
actors are disagreeing because they play different roles and conceptually driven 
cooperation is difficult to obtain, the ministry have to balance the different definitions 
and interpretations and is doing that in a political–administrative context that is resulting 
in a compromise that is the smartest one possible under the circumstances. 
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Discussion 
Historically speaking, Norway has had a rather unified and integrated central state 
system, with relatively strong political control of agencies by the cabinet and the 
ministries (Christensen 2003). Nevertheless, this system has been «flexible or smart 
enough» to accommodate a variety of considerations, which may explain why it lasted 
relatively unchanged for 150 years. In practice the system has been very robust, since the 
agency model represents a broad organizational form that allows a wide variety of 
actions. Using as a basis our broad institutional perspective, it is possible to show how 
the system has combined hierarchical control by politicians, the influence and partial 
autonomy of professional groups (reflecting some heterogeneity), a stable environment, 
a cultural consensus and the peaceful coexistence of many actors, creating an 
atmosphere of mutual trust. Moreover, since World War II the model has also included 
co-operation between interest groups for collective purposes (Christensen 2003). To 
complete the picture offered by the institutional perspective – it was taken for granted 
that this integrated governmental system would be the best one over a long period of 
time. 
When NPM arrived in Norway in the 1980s, the main strategy was to adapt it to the 
historical path Norway had followed, i.e. to engage in a policy of pragmatic change 
whereby some elements from NPM—normally the least radical ones—were introduced 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1998). However, this strategy came under pressure in the 
1990s, resulting in more autonomy for the agencies. This manifested itself primarily in 
the establishment of independent state-owned companies, which were, for the most 
part, old administrative enterprises that had historically been integrated in the central 
administrative apparatus. This reflected a strong vertical inter-organizational 
specialization of the centralized state. The reasons for this development may be 
understood from the main elements in the broad institutional perspective. First, neo-
liberal entrepreneurs became more important in the reform process, partly because the 
electoral wind was blowing more towards the right, but also because the Labour Party 
became more right-leaning on these questions, creating winning coalitions. Second, the 
historical–cultural path was modified gradually, partly as a result of external pressure for 
reform, but mainly because internal actors, both political and administrative, adopted a 
more sympathetic attitude towards NPM, i.e. they increasingly thought it could be 
combined with historical traditions and develop them (Christensen 2003). Third, the 
notion that major elements from the disintegrated state model were appropriate 
increasingly became the received wisdom. The paradox is that this happened without 
Norway having any urgent need to reform, but it also explains why the old model was 
not abandoned but rather combined with NPM in various ways, without actually 
bringing about any fundamental transformation of the system. 
The effects of this first wave of NPM-related reforms seem to be rather evident. One 
main finding from a study of political and administrative elites in Norway is that the 
increase in autonomy for agencies and state-owned companies has limited cabinet 
members’ leeway for political discretion and control (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). 
The introduction of MBOR and the vertical specialization of agencies and companies 
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have increased the power of administrative leaders in the ministries and agencies at the 
expense of the ministers. In contrast to what is sought by public choice reforms this 
amounts to a considerable loss of control for the ministers and may increase the 
political risks that politicians have to take (c.f. Gregory 2003). In the Norwegian case the 
parliament seems to be more aware of these challenges than governmental executives; 
parliamentarians now often act in an unpredictable way, accepting the principle of non-
interference but interfering nonetheless when media pressure is strong, thus creating 
greater problems for the ministers. The situation is still in a state of flux, however, and 
should not be seen as a one-way development. In specific cases the political leadership is 
still able to interfere and to reassert control, as case studies of immigration and hospital 
policy illustrate (Christensen and Lægreid 2003b, Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 2003, 
Thynne 2003). Generally in Norway the constraints on the possibility to redraw the 
delegation to autonomous agencies have not been so strong that they represent a serious 
democratic problem (Hylland 2001). 
Traditionally, Norway has had a rather undifferentiated set of agencies, whereby a 
large number of different functions are covered by the same organizational units. The 
process of horizontal specialization, based on practice in the Anglo-American countries 
in general and the EU in particular, started rather later in Norway, in the mid-1990s, and 
has entailed separating out regulatory tasks and assigning them to specific agencies, as 
highlighted by the White Paper issued by the current government in 2003. However, 
this policy has yet to be fully implemented and may well run into problems, as illustrated 
by the case of internal security. It does, however, signal the adoption of another element 
in the development towards the disintegrated state. 
Our broad institutional perspective can be used to identify certain typical features of 
this reform process. First, it shows a political leadership eager to introduce more 
structural devolution, entailing increased vertical and horizontal specialization. The 
arguments supporting this policy attend very little to the challenges of political control 
posed by a new system of this type and tend instead to see it mainly in terms of 
efficiency and technical aspects of administration. So smart practice is more easily 
associated with something that is apolitical or anti-political, which is difficult to enact in 
a political–administrative context. Thus this policy is in practice resulting in 
compromises concerning the autonomy of the regulatory agencies and the organisation 
of the appeals process but nonetheless moving the regulatory agencies in the direction 
of more independence. The reform process is also generally characterized by somewhat 
inconsistent and ambiguous organizational thinking, concerning the implications of 
autonomy, the way ownership and regulatory functions should be organized and the 
sector-affiliation of the regulatory agencies. 
Second, there is evidence of a changing culture concerning the regulatory agencies. 
The leaders of these agencies, like the leaders of general agencies and SOCs, are now 
tending to welcome the new development, as are administrative leaders in the ministries. 
This makes it easier to implement the reforms, even though some political executives 
and parties in parliament are reluctant to accept this cultural change (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2002). Third, external international and national pressure for reforms has 
grown in Norway over the last few years. It is now widely accepted that NPM-related 
reforms are appropriate and good. Nevertheless, more criticism is now being voiced 
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nationally than before, while international trends are starting to point in rather different 
directions, feeding this resistance. 
The reorganization of the administration of internal security and the increased 
autonomy of NTPA to handle individual cases in the telecommunications sector  show 
that this policy field is politically very controversial and complex. Individual cases of 
reorganization or regulation cannot be viewed in isolation as examples of technical 
implementation but need to be treated as political cases, involving political steering, 
external pressure and historical–institutional constraints. The cases reveal that in 
practice it is hard to implement the new regulatory policy program and simultaneously 
live up to the official formal governance model of frame-steering and performance-
management (Pollitt 2002). The ministries often set general objectives that are vague, 
contradictory and subject to change, involving unresolved trade-offs. Often the ministry 
allows the agencies to set their own standards and targets but neglects to monitor these 
targets. When something goes wrong and there is media pressure or lobbying, the 
ministry can interfere and withdraw some of the liberties of the agencies, formulate new 
rules and criticize the agencies for actions that had actually not been discussed or 
clarified when targets were set (Pollitt 2002). Neither does the practitioner’s model fit in 
very well with how the government’s comprehensive regulatory reform program is being 
implemented in specific policy areas. Rather than assuming that political executives can 
freely select desirable reform measures, one needs to take into consideration historical–
institutional constraints and external pressure. The cases we described above illustrate 
that we have to go beyond the legal status and formal powers of the government and 
the agencies to understand how political control works in practice (Pollitt 2003a). Smart 
regulatory practice is more diverse and context-dependent than the official model is 
implying.  
This paper has focused on the mismatch between the doctrine of autonomous 
regulatory agencies and how they work in practice, and question whether implementing 
this doctrine fully would have produced a smarter practice. Instead of deriving 
explanations based on one dominant logic, the challenge is to develop more complex 
propositions about how the regulatory agencies are organized, how they work and how 
they are transformed. The de facto control and autonomy relationship varies across 
countries, between agencies and within the same agency over time. The reform process 
has been dominated by the criteria used to determine how agencies are supposed to 
behave, according to an idealised model, rather than by empirical documentation of how 
they actually work in practice (Pollitt 2003b). Furthermore, the dominant model is a 
complicated mixture of the New Public Management ideal of performance 
management, frame-steering and agency autonomy on the one hand, and demands for 
democratic governance based on democratic transparency, accountability, control and 
responsiveness on the other. We are facing simultaneous pressure to adapt to new 
forms of regulation and control and to guarantee the robustness of sustained democratic 
governance. This complexity places a heavy burden on both agency management and on 
political governance. Formal regulatory agency status seems to be a broad category 
allowing a variety of actual behaviour. Thus, we must go beyond formal legal models of 
agency status and examine «living» institutions.  
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An examination of the formulation of regulatory policy, the implementation of the 
policy program and how relations between ministries and agencies work in practice 
reveals a complex mixture of external pressure from dominant international agency 
doctrines, domestic administrative and institutional context and political choices made 
by government executives and political leaders. To understand both policy development 
and practice in the field of regulatory agencies we have to go beyond one-factor 
explanations and look at transformation and translation processes (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001, Czerniawska and Sevon 1996). The trade-off between autonomy and 
control will thus be influenced by the motivation of central actors to interfere. But the 
equation can also be affected by the distribution of professional expertise. If the 
ministry lacks the knowledge or capacity to assess what is going on in the agencies it will 
also experience problems in exercising political control. This is especially likely to be the 
case with agencies handling complicated technical matters involving advanced science 
and technology. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have focused on the balance between political control and agency 
autonomy in the central governmental apparatus in Norway. It has been shown how the 
gradual shift from an integrated to a disintegrated state has produced instability in this 
balance rather than the enhanced stability promised by the reform entrepreneurs. 
Whether this is smart is debatable. We started out by describing the different driving 
forces behind the traditional agency model in Norway, a model that remained quite 
stable for about 150 years. We then traced the increased structural devolution of 
agencies from the mid-1990s onwards and analysed the effects of this on political 
control. Regulatory reform started late in Norway, so the focus of our analysis was on 
processes that have taken place in the last few years, both concerning organizational 
thinking advanced by the political leadership and the compromises reached in 
parliament with its opponents. The result has been increased autonomy for the 
regulatory agencies and a more specific allocation of tasks, but not as much as intended. 
We then discussed how the reforms have worked in practice, focusing on two policy 
areas to illustrate the unstable balance between political control and agency autonomy.  
In a period when the doctrine of agencification, structural devolution and  
antonomization is strong, there is considerable institutional confusion about what tasks, 
objectives and responsibility the autonomous agencies should have (Olsen 1998). 
Democratic control seems to be have been weakened by this new autonomy, even if it is 
not absolute, but it is unclear what kinds of interests and considerations are replacing 
traditional political signals and discretion or how the trade-off between political control 
and agency autonomy will unfold over time. A fundamental question is what 
consequences these reforms will have for the legitimacy of the political–administrative 
system within a representative democracy. One observation is that power relations seem 
to be changing faster than accountability relations. The political leadership often finds 
itself in situations where it has responsibility without the corresponding power and 
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control (Brunsson 1989). Conversely, many of the independent and autonomous 
agencies may gain more power without necessarily becoming more accountable. 
It is, however, important to underline that there is great uncertainty about the effects 
and implications of modern reforms, and one suspects that many of the administrative 
reforms, including the principle of single-purpose organizations and independent 
agencies, represent ideological imports rather than real innovations and smart practice. 
When practice is not consistent with the administrative model, this does not necessarily 
imply that practice is wrong or not smart. Lack of correspondence may just as well be a 
problem of the model as an implementation problem.  
In recent years the importance of the historical–institutional context has been 
rediscovered (Olsen 2004). The need for in-depth understanding of the special 
situations of individual countries is now being underlined to a greater extent (World 
Bank 2000). Priorities have shifted from a drive to create agencies and autonomous 
bodies to a striving to achieve good governance generally and more specifically to find 
the right balance between accountability and autonomy by focusing on weak co-
ordination devices, lack of governing capacity and weak accountability mechanisms 
(OECD 2002b). One main lesson is that context matters. The effects of structural 
arrangements, culture and the present parliamentary situation are dependent on the 
character of the policy issue on the agenda and the tasks that different agencies handle. 
The policy salience or sensitivity seems to be especially challenging for the balance 
between political control and autonomy. 
The data presented reveal that in practice it may become difficult to live up to the 
principles of autonomization and the official formal governance model of frame-
steering and performance management, but this fact don’t necessarily undermine the 
ability of producing smart regulatory practice. The slogan «more steering in big issues 
and less steering in small issues» seems to be easier in theory than in practice. This 
corresponds with experience from other reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2003a, 
2003c; Pollitt 2002). The situation may lead to political executives finding themselves in 
a «Catch-22 situation». If a politician abstains from involvement, he or she may be 
criticised for being too passive; by intervening, however, he or she may be accused of 
not complying with the rules of the game. 
Our conclusion is that stability in the trade-off between autonomy and control is an 
elusive goal. Achieving a balance between the two has been a recurring problem in 
Norwegian administrative history (Grønlie 2001) and it is an open question whether 
more professional independence for experts in autonomous agencies will prevail, or 
whether there will be a counter-wave of re-politicization. The lesson is that an unstable 
balance between autonomy and control is not a specific problem of the organization of 
the public sector but rather a basic systemic feature. The issue cannot be resolved once 
and for all. Instead one has to learn to live with partly conflicting values. How this 
situation is handled is determined to a great extent by the domestic political–
administrative culture and structural features as well as by the external influence of the 
dominant international administrative doctrine. The extensive reform efforts have not 
resolved the enduring tensions between politics and administration, between autonomy 
and control, between centralisation and decentralisation, and between market efficiency 
and other values such as security, openness, democratic representativeness, professional 
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quality and integrity and Rechtstaat values and rules. These are tensions which cannot be 
easily resolved. 
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